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Abstract 
Purpose of the review: This review presents recent research on collective action in agricultural markets, focusing on the institutional 
settings that increase market access for smallholder farmers. It focuses attention on challenging research areas that try to understand 
and resolve the inherent contradictions that exist between members in the group and between the group and others.  
Findings: Collective action in agricultural markets is facilitated by institutional arrangements that effectively resolve the inherent ten-
sions within groups as well as between farmers and other economic agents. Research explores the logic of collective marketing and the 
impact of trust and reputation on the mediation of opportunistic action in groups. Special attention is given to institutional arrangements 
on the interface between vertical and horizontal coordination in food chains, especially related to strategies of producer organisations to 
by-pass middlemen, to meet quality requirements in modern markets and to effectively use postharvest technologies. Research points to 
the importance of formal and informal rules and regulations in enabling farmers’ organisations to bulk and process agricultural products.  
Directions for future research: Informed decision making by value chain actors on replicating or upscaling institutional arrangements 
to improve the performance of their value chain needs information on its social embeddedness and its relation with the legal environ-
ment. More comparative research is needed on “workable models” and “best practices” for facilitating collaborative marketing in de-
veloping countries. 
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Introduction 
Stimulated by the writings of North [1] and Williamson [2], 
market imperfections and the importance of institutions 
have become a central notion in most economic literature on 
agricultural development and smallholder market access. 
Informal and formal rules governing market transactions 
between competing actors with imperfect knowledge of 
market conditions have replaced the notion of the “invisible 
hand in perfect markets”. These rules make up the institu-
tional framework [1] or institutional matrix [3] in which 
market transactions take place. North argues that the institu-
tional matrix, comprised of institutions (“rules of the game”) 
and organisations (“players of the game”), is context and 
time specific. The institutional matrix itself is inherently 
dynamic: it functions as the incentive structure in which 
organisations strive to change institutions to better suit their 
interests. Different structures have developed in different 
areas and periods and, as such, result in divergent patterns of 
economic development. In developing countries, with low 
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and uneven economic development, this points towards chal-
lenges to improve these rules and regulations [1, 4–9]. 
 
The new focus on institutions has resulted in policy initia-
tives to make “markets work for the poor” and in adjustment 
policies in the enabling environment for smallholder farmers 
[10–13]. This has led to a rethinking about the role of the 
state in facilitating market access for smallholder farmers. 
The role of marketing boards has become a point for much 
debate [14, 15]. Instead of direct public interference in mar-
kets as a buyer or seller, the role of the state has evolved to 
provide rules for the creation of effective institutions to regu-
late and facilitate markets [4]. Rashid et al. [16] took stock of 
current activities of parastatals in grain markets in Asia and 
point to high cost and the tendency for these to become vehi-
cles for special interest groups. However, several other stud-
ies propose that agricultural stagnation, especially in Africa, 
is partly a result of the dismantling of state-led organisations 
(such as parastatals) in an era of liberalisation and privatisa-
tion, and its failure to replace them with institutions and pub-
lic policies that can facilitate smallholder access to market 
[17–21]. Smallholder farmers face difficulties in liberalised 
markets and need to generate new ways of cooperation and 
collective action to fill the institutional gap created by a re-
treating state [6]. 
 
With a waning state, many see farmers’ organisations as key 
actors in marketing smallholders’ produce and in lobbying 
for effective market institutions and government policies [5, 
17, 22]. Farmers’ organisations have become actors in and 
objects of policies for institutional innovations: policies are 
supposed to stimulate the emergence of dynamic farmers’ 
organisations that link small scattered farmers and retailers in 
the value chain [23–25]. The preparatory phase of the World 
Development Report (2008) has generated increased atten-
tion towards the role of rural producer organisations [26, 27]. 
A range of publications on producer organisations geared to 
an audience of development practitioners have been pub-
lished with lessons learnt and approaches for effectively 
strengthening smallholders’ access to markets [28–33].  
 
Postharvest research has traditionally focused on factors re-
lated to production, handling and storage that influence the 
quality or quantity of the product in the downstream market. 
Many factors that define product quality are in the realm of 
individual household production, but a whole range of post-
harvest technologies have been developed to fit collective 
marketing arrangements including: procedures for quality 
assurance, delaying quality deterioration during storage or 
improving processing technologies. However, these technolo-
gies do not work independent of the social context: they are 
used in a specific division of labour between chain actors, 
with specific rules for contracting and control of these tasks, 
and in a context of (perceived) risks, costs and benefits.  
 
Postharvest technologies will only work when embedded in 
an appropriate institutional arrangement. Economic feasibil-
ity is important, but it is not the only determining factor for 
successful adoption. Informal and formal rules influence the 
possibilities of finding workable arrangements around these 
technologies, so farmers may decide to make use of or to 
refrain from using these technologies. Many postharvest 
technologies and collective processing facilities have been 
abandoned because the institutional arrangement proved not 
to be resilient enough to cope with tensions in local cultures 
[34], changing donor support [35, 36] or the lack of trust 
within the group [37].  
 
This review is based on two major lines of research on farm-
ers’ organisations and market access. The first line of re-
search explores the logic of collective action and the impact 
of trust, reputation and mind sets for opportunistic action in 
groups. Special focus is on the interface between vertical and 
horizontal coordination in agrifood chains, especially related 
to changing quality requirements. A second line of research 
analyses the relation between these institutional arrangements 
with the changing policy environment. Workable arrange-
ments can only be replicated when the institutional environ-
ment is sufficiently conductive. Therefore, several research-
ers analyse the constraints in the enabling environment for 
farmers’ organisations to bulk and process agricultural prod-
ucts and stress the political process needed to generate insti-
tutional innovations. 
 
Collective action and smallholder market access 
Groups that collectively strive to attain benefits for their 
members face a major challenge: passive group members 
tend to benefit from the efforts of active group members. The 
efforts of active members can be diverse: it may be an invest-
ment in kind, but may also consist of time spent on issues 
related to the group or even his/her individual social status, 
which may be compromised by working to the benefit of the 
group. This problem of collective action was put on the re-
search agenda by Olson [38]. It has also gained predomi-
nance in studies on cooperation and most notably in research 
on groups that pool income as a group and distribute this to 
members in equal parts [37, 39, 40]. Several scholars have 
taken the free-rider problem as a decision making challenge 
and searched for ways in which this phenomenon can be me-
diated. Trust and learning have developed as key issues that 
can prevent opportunistic action in groups. Ortmann and 
King, reviewing the South African cooperative legislation 
[41], stress the need for a “life cycle perspective” to coopera-
tives as they will have to respond with organisational changes 
in response to the free-rider challenge and need a legal 
framework to do so. Game theory has developed as a sub-
discipline in economics and business science to mathemati-
cally model strategic behaviour within collective action [42]. 
 
Farmers’ organisations are a specific type of collective ac-
tion. They generate income by the provision of some sort of 
commercial service to their constituents. Postharvest activi-
ties: bulking, processing and packaging are necessary for 
market access and need coordinated action. These services 
can be the main economic objective of the group, but often, 
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access to rural development support [26, 43] and the protec-
tion of land property rights [44] are more fundamental in 
understanding the resilience of groups.  
 
To balance the efforts of active members with the benefits for 
all members, the group needs to generate its “own income” to 
pay for the expenses made by active members or hired pro-
fessional staff. Income from service provisioning to members 
is used to bear the cost associated with collective action and 
the remainder is distributed to members, partly by increasing 
the price of agricultural produce sourced from them, and 
partly by profit distribution. This twofold way of distributing 
economic benefits makes the producer organisation different 
from a conventional firm. Profit maximisation, as the guiding 
strategy for private firms, is mixed with the objectives of 
maximising turn-over and improving input price levels to 
members: economic benefits of the member-owner is gener-
ally higher through transactions with the cooperative than by 
the profit generated by the cooperative. Business strategies 
and partnering behaviour is not totally geared to profitability. 
The role of elected board members in decision making in a 
cooperative generates dynamics that in the normal investor 
owned firm do not occur [45]: they need to align different 
“inside” members interest, while the firm typically has 
“outside” capital investors as the prime decision-making 
group.  
 
The most common activity of collective action by farmers in 
agriculture is the bulking of produce for collective marketing 
or processing [29, 46]. A group of farmers supply their lim-
ited quantities of crop harvested to generate sufficient quanti-
ties of the product as needed by prospective buyers and de-
fine a common price-for-quality system. The crucial function 
of traders and middlemen in value chains is increasingly be-
ing recognised [47, 48]. Typically, within rural societies, the 
traditional private bulking agent is the village-based farmer-
trader that works as an agent for an urban based merchant or 
processor. Farmers’ organisations tend to look for ways to 
provide these bulking services to their members, substituting 
these intermediaries. In doing so, the member will have lower 
transaction costs, as costs to find a buyer and complete the 
market transactions are reduced by eliminating the costs of 
the intermediaries. However, they will increase the costs as-
sociated with collective efforts to perform the same services. 
A resulting net benefit will provide an important incentive for 
member loyalty to the collective marketing group. Without 
external donor support, this net benefit must be derived from 
efficiencies in economic transactions compared to the trader, 
like economies of scale in logistics, market information or 
postharvest handling. In this bulking process, several issues 
are crucial: weight of the product, quality of the product, 
transport logistics and the costs of capital immobilisation.  
 
Vertical integration 
The business strategy of vertical integration, by-passing in-
termediary traders and processors, is being questioned: the 
complexity of trade, the risks involved, the working capital 
requied and the need for flexibly to adapt the product portfo-
lio to market demand are the main reasons for the failure of 
many producer organisations to become successful in market-
ing, especially in perishable products [49]. Therefore spot 
markets are still the dominant market outlet for smallholders. 
Vorley et al. [25] conclude that improving traditional markets 
may offer better prospects for increasing smallholder market 
access than linking them directly with supermarkets. Because 
formal institutions often do not provide financial services in 
rural areas, traditional traders respond to the preharvest cash 
needs of farmers [49]. The issue of working capital and cash 
payments to members therefore needs to be resolved by the 
group willing to engage in collective marketing [50], or the 
producer organisation needs to generate a price-differential 
large enough for members to make them wait for deferred 
payment. Development cooperation (= access to working 
capital) and fair-trade (= access to premium niche markets) 
are therefore crucial and logically related to the emergence of 
many of the new producer organisations in developing coun-
tries that effectively provide market access to smallholder 
farmers [28], inclusive to poorer strata of the population [51]. 
Discussions about the lack of sustainability as a result of low 
self-financing capacity and the lack of political autonomy 
due to donor dependency reflect the more challenging sides 
of this reality [52]. 
 
Postharvest technologies 
Postharvest technologies can function as a catalyst for spe-
cific modalities of organisational group members. Successful 
examples of postharvest technologies effectively adopted by 
organised farmers include the West-African cereal banks 
[53], the Central American grain silo supply chain, and the 
cooling tanks in dairy production modules [54]. All include 
hard technologies adapted by smallholder farmers that are 
embedded in successful context specific “soft technology” 
institutional arrangements. These arrangements are context 
specific, but share a common feature that group pressure is 
mobilised effectively to discipline would-be-opportunistic 
individuals (eg, delivering low quality products or default on 
loans for working capital). The creation of “trust” between 
chain actors is intimately related to the presence of credible 
ways of containing untrustworthy behaviour [55], through 
“lean but effective” internal rules and regulations.  
 
Quality requirements 
Quality requirements, often intimately related to farmers’ 
practices in production, are increasingly important [56]. 
These requirements have to be communicated and enforced. 
Especially related to agrifood chains is a wide range of stud-
ies that analyse the role of trust, reputation and regularity in 
transactions in supplier-client relations [23, 57]. Capacity 
enhancing investments of a buyer to inform or train the sup-
plying farmers in specific treatment and handling procedures 
is only feasible where this farmer sells to that buyer after 
harvest. This possible dead-lock, due to the absence of credi-
ble commitments, is typically resolved by the institutional 
arrangement of contract farming, which combines service 
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delivery with in-advance binding sales agreements [58, 59]. 
These services can be provided by the procuring firm or by 
other service providers using the contract as a guarantee for 
service payment [60]. Unequal power relations are inherent 
in most contract farming arrangements between agribusiness 
and smallholders. Alternative arrangements for service provi-
sion, linked to marketing smallholder produce that are less 
dependent on one specific powerful buyer are being explored, 
but tend to be marginal in developing countries. Bijman [61] 
explains the functioning of auction systems as a model of 
collective marketing. Coulter and Onumah [62] describe the 
use of the regulated Warehouse Receipt Systems, as a prom-
ising institutional arrangement to generate cash for trade and 
to improve stability in prices, while maintaining non-
exclusivity between trading partners.  
 
Legal framework 
Formal rules, laws and regulations shape the marketing sys-
tem in which farmers operate [56]. However, informal rules 
are considered to be far more important in creating the condi-
tions under which transactions take place [1, 43, 47]. Mecha-
nisms to secure compliance with contracts by farmers in de-
veloping countries are rooted in legal pluralism: interwoven 
formal and informal rules that are generally enforced without 
the direct involvement of courts and judges, but by a subtle 
process of combining, formal and informal institutions to put 
pressure on the potential offender [47, 63, 64]. To be success-
ful, the rules and institutions must be embedded in the local 
culture and relate to the characteristics of the agricultural 
sector [65]. Policies to improve the institutional environment 
are socially embedded and will have to build on country spe-
cific historical trajectories [1]. “Modern” fiscal and adminis-
trative regulations in a context of widespread informal trade 
may provide incentives for farmer organisations to choose 
modes of operation that may end up excluding them from 
contracts and financial services[66].  
 
Trade policies and regulations affecting access to markets 
will differ between the type of commodities and between 
countries, and result from a history with specific configura-
tions of interest groups that influence decision making [16, 
67]. In most countries there are policies and regulations 
(economic, fiscal, agricultural, rural, etc) that could be better 
adapted to the particularities of smallholder farmers and their 
economic organisations, eg, competition policy, taxation pol-
icy and risk mitigation mechanisms [68]. As many of the 
policies that relate to the institutional environment for farm-
ers to access agricultural markets are generic, they fail to 
consider the specific features of smallholder farming and 
their forms of economic organisation. Advocacy efforts to 
change these institutions to the benefit of smallholders’ often 
face strong opposition from vested interests in the economy 
and related bureaucracies.  
 
Conclusion 
This article gives an overview of current research on collec-
tive marketing by smallholder farmers. It focuses attention to 
challenging research areas that try to understand and resolve 
the inherent contradictions that exist between members in the 
group and between the group and others. Institutional eco-
nomics with its attention on the constraints of actors operat-
ing in real markets can provide a useful framework for de-
scribing and analysing marketing strategies and institutional 
arrangements that link smallholders to markets more up-
stream in the chain. Postharvest research will benefit from 
descriptions of effective institutional arrangements around 
processing and storage technologies that are socially embed-
ded and that depend from the specific historical evolution of 
the legal environment in each developing country. The con-
cept of transaction costs and the analysis of the institutional 
matrix that underpins these costs, will add to the comparabil-
ity of case studies and helps to explore the “generalisation 
domain”, the extent to which workable institutional arrange-
ments in collective marketing may be replicated [69] under 
different socio-economic and political conditions. 
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